Does regulation drive market competition? Evidence from the Spanish local TV industry by Gil, Ricard
 
 

















DOES REGULATION DRIVE MARKET COMPETITION? 






















IESE Business School – University of Navarra 
Av. Pearson, 21 – 08034 Barcelona, Spain. Phone: (+34) 93 253 42 00 Fax: (+34) 93 253 43 43 
Camino del Cerro del Águila, 3 (Ctra. de Castilla, km 5,180) – 28023 Madrid, Spain. Phone: (+34) 91 357 08 09 Fax: (+34) 91 357 29 13 
 
Copyright © 2011 IESE Business School. 
Working Paper 
WP-895 
January, 2011  
 






























The Public-Private Sector Research Center is a Research Center based at IESE Business 
School. Its mission is to develop research that analyses the relationships between the 
private and public sectors primarily in the following areas: regulation and competition, 
innovation, regional economy and industrial politics and health economics.   
Research results are disseminated through publications, conferences and colloquia. 
These activities are aimed to foster cooperation between the private sector and public 
administrations, as well as the exchange of ideas and initiatives.  
The sponsors of the SP-SP Center are the following:  
  Accenture 
  Ajuntament de Barcelona 
  Caixa Manresa 
  Cambra Oficial de Comerç, Indústria i Navegació de Barcelona 
  Departament d’ Economia i Finances de la Generalitat de Catalunya 
  Departament d’ Innovació, Universitats i Empresa de la Generalitat de Catalunya 
  Diputació de Barcelona 
  Endesa 
  FOBSIC 
  Fundació AGBAR 
  Garrigues 
  Institut Català de les Indústries Culturals 
  Mediapro 
  Sanofi Aventis 
  ATM, FGC y TMB 
The contents of this publication reflect the conclusions and findings of the individual 
authors, and not the opinions of the Center's sponsors.  
 





DOES REGULATION DRIVE MARKET COMPETITION? 




















Keywords: regulation, market, competition, TV industry, liberalization. 
 
1 Assistant Professor, Economics Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, and Research Affiliate, SP-SP Center IESE. 
Email: rgil@ucsc.edu. Acknowledge to the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation under ECO2008-05155. 
 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The role of market regulation has generated much debate in Economics. Ideally, governments
should set market regulation such that ﬁrms compete in ways that beneﬁt consumers and yet they
a r ea b l et oo b t a i np r o ﬁts. In practice, existing regulation is relatively rigid when compared to a
quickly evolving world of new products and new industries. This fact drives ﬁrms to compete in
dimensions that may diminish consumer surplus and total welfare. Additionally, regulation may
be conservative or liberal. The former may be more likely to discourage competition to strengthen
provision of valuable dimension, while the latter may encourage competition between ﬁrms in all
possible dimensions. Therefore, it is important to understand how regulation aﬀects the nature
of competition in an industry since this will have most likely ultimate eﬀects on consumer surplus
and welfare.
Despite the existing research on regulation and its impact on competition, we know very little
about the nature of competition in the absence of regulation and whether introducing regulation, of
any type, is indeed beneﬁcial or detrimental to consumers and society by strengthening or softening
competition. The direction of this eﬀect could go either way. In the absence of regulation, ﬁrms
may be more likely to collude or compete in some dimensions at the expense of the most welfare-
increasing dimensions. In that case, the introduction of regulation may deter ﬁrms from cutting
on those “good” dimensions and therefore regulation could be beneﬁcial.1 Ultimately whether
regulation increases or decreases competition is an empirical question and we are forced to look at
data to ﬁnd answers to it. It is here where the contribution of this paper lies.
In this paper, I examine how competition changes within an industry with the introduction of
regulation and a posterior liberalization. In particular, I examine the case of the local television
1See Armstrong and Vickers (1993) and Vickers (1995) as examples of theoretical literature that provides case-
speciﬁc predictions about the relation between regulation and competition.
2industry in Spain. Up to 1995, Spanish local TV stations were alegal. This meant that they
were not recognized nor protected by the law as legal entities. Therefore, their activities were
not illegal but they were not legal either. This situation of alegality came to an end when the
ﬁrst law of Spanish local TV was approved by Spanish parliament. Later, and after a change of
government, this law was reformed and the industry liberalized between 2000 and 2002. Here I
use these changes in regulation to answer the question of whether regulation increased or decreased
competition in the Spanish local television industry.
To do so, I use the census of Spanish local TV stations for the years 1996, 1999 and 2002. The
census provides information on the number of local TV stations located in each city. The census
lists a total of 881, 740 and 898 stations for 1996, 1999 and 2002 respectively. I complement this
information with city information for all cities in Spain with more than 1000 inhabitants. These
are 3209 cities of which 2647, 2665 and 2617 did not have a local TV station in 1996, 1999 and 2002
respectively. Using methodology from the various papers of Bresnahan and Reiss (1989, 1990 and
1991), I estimate entry thresholds in terms of population necessary to sustain an extra ﬁrm in the
market. I do this for all three years in my sample and therefore I am able to compare how these
thresholds change from a situation where no regulation was in place to a conservative regulation
and its posterior liberalization.
My ﬁndings suggest that competition among stations was softer when no regulation was in
place. When comparing competition when regulation was more restrictive or permissive, I ﬁnd
that, if anything, stations face softer competition under more permissive (liberalized) regulation.
At ﬁrst sight, this is at odds with what one may expect and with other results in the literature. I
explain this result by looking closer into the institutional details of this industry and the changes
in regulation. When liberalizing this industry in the year 2000, the Spanish government allowed
ﬁrms to form local station networks that allowed coordination, communication and content sharing
3across stations. Given the low proﬁtability in this industry and the strong presence of not-for-proﬁt
networks, local TV stations had very strong incentives to collude and soften competition to ensure
their survival in this market.
This paper mainly contributes to the empirical literature that examines the relation between
regulation and competition in various industries. Some examples of work by others are Joskow
(1973) and Samprone (1979) in the property and liability insurance industry, Klein (1990) in the
railroad industry, or Joskow (1980) and Fanara and Greenberg (1985) in the health industry. To
the best of my knowledge, the closest paper in topic and goal is Danzon and Chao (2000). In
their paper, they ﬁnd that regulation undermines competition across generic competitors in the
pharmaceutical industry by examining price competition in this industry in seven diﬀerent countries
with diﬀerent types of regulation. My paper diﬀers from theirs in that I estimate entry thresholds
in the Spanish local TV industry in three diﬀerent scenarios that diﬀer in regulation. My result is
also diﬀerent in that I ﬁnd that competition is stronger when ﬁrms are more highly regulated.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I describe the institutional details of the Spanish
local TV industry and the introduction and change of regulation. Section 3 presents the data. In
section 4 I describe the empirical methodology that I use in the paper, show the results, and ﬁnally,
oﬀer a discussion of the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional Details
This section builds up from information obtained in personal interviews with industry managers
and previous work (Gil (2009)). Television stations maximize proﬁts in two ways. They produce
content that they sell to television consumers through subscription fees, or sell television space to
advertisers. Since television consumers value television content free of advertising and advertisers
4value the number of television viewers, stations choose accordingly the amount of advertising and
the value of the subscription fee to maximize total proﬁts.
In addition to this, TV stations carefully choose the content of their programming to attract
both viewers and advertisers. In this industry, programming content is important because it
diﬀerentiates the station product from others. Other factors that play an important role in this
industry are whether the station is privately owned (versus owned by local government), whether
the station is integrated into a network, and whether the station broadcasts its programming. In
the next section, I discuss further these factors as I draw distinctions between the European and
American model as well as the idiosyncrasies of the Spanish local TV industry.
2.1 European versus American Model of Local Television
To understand how competition in the Spanish local TV industry works, I ﬁrst need to point out
the main diﬀerences between television markets in Europe and in the US. The US market is mainly
characterized by its little government intervention and its verticality, whereas the European markets
are mainly characterized by strong government intervention and its lack of verticality.
The US TV industry was ﬁrst started and dominated by big stations in big markets. As smaller
stations started to arise in smaller markets, they became dependent of the dominant stations
because these were the main providers of content. Eventually, these relationships of content
exchange were so frequent that dominant stations and local stations formed what today we know
as TV networks. Nowadays, local stations are ascribed to the networks and even though some of
their content is directly provided by the network, they still produce a share of their programming
that reﬂects the unique interest of the local demand.
This diﬀers much from the European case. The European TV industry was mainly monitored
by the government of each respective country. Entry in this industry was highly regulated and the
5emergence of local stations was limited. Most countries entered the 1980s with only government-
owned stations and, at most, a few regional stations that broadcast for a limited range of their
national territory. Given the dominant role played by national and regional stations, there was
no room left for local stations since regulation did not even acknowledge them as a legal entity.
In other words, local stations were alegal because they were not legal but they were not illegal
either. Since this paper studies the Spanish case and the consequences of changes in regulation on
competition, let me now describe the case of Spain as an example.
Spain counted with two TV stations until the mid 1980s, TVE and TVE2. The former was
the main station and the latter served as window to minority content and local news emitted from
small satellite stations that had little independence on their programming decisions. During the
mid 1980s and the consolidation of the new democratic regime, the central government granted the
right to its regional counterparts to develop regional stations. Still then, the local TV station as
entity was not recognized by law. Despite this, a number of local stations were created in the late
1980s as a result of the joint eﬀort of local civil associations. Since these local stations were neither
prohibited nor recognized by the law, police authorities often did not know what to do about them.
Many other local stations were created in the following years and, as their activities grew in
importance both economically and culturally speaking, the need for a legal framework became clear
to many politicians and regulators. As a result of this, the Spanish government approved the law
of local TV stations in 1996 through which it pretended to regulate the composition, commercial
activities, ownership and competitive structure of the local TV station industry in Spain. Some
of the most controversial points of the 1996 Law were that no more than two local stations were
allowed per city (regardless of city population), network formation was prohibited and all local TV
stations were to be non-proﬁt organizations and hold local government personnel on their advisory
and executive boards.
62.2 Liberalization of the Spanish Local TV Industry
The 1996 Spanish election changed the scenario quite a bit. The left-winged PSOE party lost
the election and the new party in power, the right-winged Partido Popular, had a very diﬀerent
perspective in how the Spanish local television industry should be regulated, if at all. In short,
the Partido Popular believed that this industry needed to be deregulated and liberalized. For this
reason, they started a liberalization process that proved to be rockier than ﬁrst anticipated.
Due to the lack of support in congress, the initiative of the new government did not go forward.
As a consequence, the government chose to start a “silent” liberalization. Badillo (2003) docu-
ments how the government chose not to enforce the law in place that was passed by the previous
government. In the 2000 election Partido Popular gained full control of the Parliament and decided
to push the deregulation that had been stopped during the previous legislature. The government
ﬁnally passed a new law in 2002 through which the 1996 law was modiﬁed and that started the
liberalization and deregulation of the Spanish local television industry. The new law did not regu-
late the local market structure per municipality nor the station ownership. In particular, stations
were no longer required to be government owned or run by local government oﬃcials. Similarly,
stations were allowed to be organizations run for proﬁt, and allowed to be part of networks with
other local television stations and national and regional stations.
In this paper and the following sections in particular, I examine how changes in regulation
aﬀected the nature of competition. When regulating this industry, Spanish policy makers wanted
to control the nature of competition. This paper assesses whether regulation strengthen or soften
competition as the industry went from unregulated in 1996, to strongly regulated in 1999 and
deregulated in 2002.
73D a t a
The data set used in this paper comes from two diﬀerent sources. The ﬁrst source is the Spanish
census of local TV stations collected by the Asociacion de Investigacion de Medios de Comunicacion
(AIMC hereafter) for years 1996, 1999 and 2002. These census collect information on the name and
number of local TV stations per city and province for the years 1996, 1999 and 2002.2 According to
the data, there were 881 stations in 1996, 740 stations in 1999 and 898 in 2002. The second source of
data is the business activity and population census published annually by “La Caixa.” This census
contains yearly information at the city, province and region level on population, unemployment rate,
number of cars, and other similar variables. Out of this information, I can compute population
growth rates at the city and province level, as well as the number of cars per capita or the number
of bank oﬃces for every 1000 people.3 This census contains information on 3209 cities, all of them
cities that at some point had 1000 inhabitants or more. When I merge both data sets, I lose a
few stations that are located in cities smaller than 1000 inhabitants. The ﬁnal data set contains
information for 3209 cities in all three years. Out of these, 2647, 2665 and 2617 cities did not have
any stations in years 1996, 1999 and 2002 respectively.
Table 1 provides summary statistics across years and cities. Information in this table shows
that the average city had 0.25 stations with the median value being 0 and the maximum 17. Overall
in the data, 13% of the cities have one station, 2.7% have two stations, 1% have three stations, 0.3%
have four stations and 0.4% of the cities have ﬁve or more stations. The average city has 12000
inhabitants and grew almost 4%. The unemployment rate average 3.8%, there are 0.3 cars per
2AIMC did not include sporadic and random emission of television content but rather established entities that emit
in a regular basis. AIMC also sent a questionnaire to all stations in the census. This questionnaire asked questions
regarding their schedule, content, coverage area and other business related issues. I do not use this information in
this paper. Gil (2009) describes the nature of that data further.
3The data did not contain information on population for 1996, and so I proxied that with population levels of
1998. I calculated population growth by looking at growth between 1996 and 1999, 1999 and 2002, and 2002 and
2005.
8person and 0.4 bank oﬃce per every 1000 people in each city. Finally, 55% of the cities in the data
belong to coastal provinces. This last variable is important because land prices and population
density are always higher on the coast than inland.
Table 2 repeats the exercise in Table 1 breaking t h es a m p l eb yy e a r . T h i st a b l es h o w st h a tt h e
average number of stations decreased from 1996 to 1999, but grew again in 2002 to slightly higher
levels than 1996. This overall growth in the number of stations is mainly driven by two extremes,
the number of cities with a monopoly station and those cities with ﬁve or more stations. The
number of stations with two, three or four stations stayed rather stable during this period of time.
The average population size grew from 11927 to 12558 and so did the population growth from 1.1%
to 6%. All other indicators indicate an improvement in the overall economy as unemployment
rates went down from 5.1% to 3.1% and the number of cars per person increased from 0.33 to 0.41.
Finally, the number of bank oﬃces per every thousand people went down from 0.44 to 0.35. This
just reﬂects the fact that bank entry did not follow the increase in population observed in the data.
Since this paper’s goal is to study the impact of changes in regulation between 1996 and 2002
on entry thresholds to study changes in the nature of competition, it is useful to understand how
market structure changed between 1996 and 2002 in a city per city basis. For this purpose, Tables
3, 4 and 5 cross-tabulate the number of local stations per city for all possible pairs of years. Table
3 tabulates the number of local stations per city in 1996 and 1999, while Table 4 and Table 5 do
so for 1999 and 2002, and 1996 and 2002 respectively. Table 3 shows how 161 cities with local
stations in 1996 had none in 1999. On the other hand, 143 cities with no stations in 1996 observed
entry in 1999. Overall, 2504 cities did not have local stations in 1996 and 1999, while 401 cities
had any stations in both years.
Tables 4 and 5 repeat the exercise in Table 3 but the former focuses in the transition between
1999 and 2002 while the latter focuses on years 1996 and 2002. Between 1999 and 2002, 2565
9cities did not have any stations. When compared to Table 3, only 52 cities had stations in 1999
and lost them all in 2002. On the other hand, 100 cities with no stations in 1999 saw entry by
2002. The rest of cities, 492 to be exact, had stations in both 1999 and 2002. The overall picture
is captured in Table 5 that tabulates the number of stations per city for 1996 and 2002. During
the whole period, 2459 cities started and ﬁnished with no stations. Out of the total 3209 cities,
158 cities lost all stations and 188 cities observed some entry. Over this period, 241 cities started
and ﬁnished with the same number of stations, while 71 cities saw their number of stations increase
and 90 saw it decreased.
Finally, Table 6 cross-tabulates changes in the number of stations between periods 1996-1999
and 1999-2002. This table shows that the number of local stations remained constant between
1996 and 2002 for 2625 cities. Only 21 cities saw their number stations increase in both periods of
time, whereas only 6 cities saw their number of stations decreased in both periods. As it is clear
from this last table in this section, most changes occurred between 1996 and 1999 since the number
of cities with no changes between 1999 and 2002 goes up to 2942 cities. In the next section, I
describe the empirical methodology that I am going to use and then I proceed with the estimation.
4 Empirical Methodology and Results
This section describes the empirical methodology in this paper. After that, I show results of
implementing this empirical strategy as well as variations from the main speciﬁcations. Finally, I
discuss the results and relate them to the existing literature.
4.1 Empirical Methodology
In this paper I follow the empirical strategy in Bresnahan and Reiss’ (BR hereafter) various papers
(1988, 1990 and 1991). Therefore I plan to infer how mark-ups vary with entry by estimating
10market entry thresholds. In their papers, BR assumes that demand takes the form
Q = d(Z,P)S(Y )
where d(Z,P) is the demand of each individual in a given market and S(Y ) is the number of
consumers in a market. P stands for prices, and Z and Y are demographic characteristics. This
functional form assumes that there is no heterogeneity across consumers within a market.
On the cost side, they assume that ﬁrms incur ﬁxed costs F(W) and marginal costs MC(q,W),
where W represents technology variables that shift exogenously the cost of ﬁrms while q stands for
the scale of production. BR contemplate the possibility of increasing marginal costs, but in the
TV industry the assumption of constant marginal costs may seem more reasonable.
Once established all the components of the demand and cost, I can write down the proﬁt
function such that
ΠN =[ PN − MC(q,W)]d(Z,PN)SN − FN
where N is the number of ﬁrms in the market and N can take values 1, 2, ... After equating proﬁts




Essentially, this ratio establishes that the market size (number of consumers) necessary to meet
the break even point when N ﬁrms are present in the market is directly proportional to the size
of ﬁxed cost and inversely proportional to the magnitude of the variable proﬁt per consumer. In
their paper and this paper, I am interested in estimating sN = SN
N which is the ﬁrm entry threshold
ratio and see how that varies with N. As established in BR (1991), the ratio sM
sN where M>N
11measures the fall in variable proﬁts per customer between a market with N ﬁrms and a market
with M ﬁr m s . T h i sw o u l do n l yb et r u ei fﬁxed costs remain constant for later entrants, otherwise
a rapid increase in ﬁxed costs may be disguised as a drop in variable proﬁt sp e rc o n s u m e rf r o m
the empirical strategy that follows. As BR note, it is important to emphasize that the use of this
methodology does not measure the level of competition in an industry, instead it measures how the
level changes with the number of ﬁrms.
Given the data from the AIMC census on local TV stations, I am far from having price and
output data for all stations in all markets. For this reason, I estimate entry thresholds by running
an ordered probit on the number of stations in each market. Following BR, we know that if we
observe N stations in a given market it must be the case that in equilibrium ΠN ≥ 0 and ΠN−1 < 0.
At this point and after several functional form assumptions, I can estimate a proﬁt function such
that
ΠN = VN(Z,W,α,β)S(Y,λ) − FN(W,γ)+u
where α, β, λ and γ are the parameters that I aim to estimate in the proﬁt function, and Y , Z and
W are variables that mean to proxy for market size as well as demand and cost shifters. Finally
u is a zero-mean constant-average iid normally distributed error term assumed to capture other
proﬁts that are orthogonal to the observables.
By assuming that u is drawn from the same distribution across markets, I can use an ordered
probit to estimate entry thresholds such that the probability of observing markets with no ﬁrms
equals
Pr(Π1 < 0) = 1 − Φ(Π1)
where Φ(.) is the cumulative normal distribution function and Π1 = Π1 + u. BR then show that
if average proﬁts decrease with ﬁr me n t r yi ne q u i l i b r i u m( Π1 ≥ Π2 ≥ Π3 ≥ ...), the probability of
12observing N in equilibrium is
Pr(ΠN ≥ 0 and ΠN+1 < 0) = Φ(ΠN) − Φ(ΠN+1).
Finally, I estimate the proﬁts of markets with 5 or more stations in a market by setting Pr(Π5 ≥
0) = Φ(Π5).
Next I state how I model S(Y,λ), VN(Z,W,α,β) and FN(W,γ) such that
S(Y,λ)=town_pop + λ1prov_pop + λ2town_pop_ growth+ λ3prov_pop_growth
The coeﬃcient of town_pop is set equal to one because VN contains a constant term. Prov_pop
stands for population of the province, town_pop_growth and prov_pop_growth is the population
growth experienced by the town and province respectively in any given year.
Im o d e lﬁrms’ variable proﬁts per consumer VN such that




where α1+Xβ stands for monopolist proﬁts and αn is the degree to which variable proﬁts decrease
with entry. The X variables come from business and population census by “La Caixa,” and they are
unemployment rate, the number of cars per person, and the number of banks oﬃces per thousand
people. It is fair to say that even though the choice of these variables that go into X is driven by
data availability, these variables capture diﬀerences across towns and provinces for any given year
in my data. Finally, I model ﬁxed costs as
FN = γ1coast + γ2province_pop∗coast
13where coast is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if city is in a coastal province, and town_pop∗coast
is the interaction of city population and the coastal dummy. These last variables are supposed to
proxy for diﬀerences across towns, within and across provinces, in land prices and wages.
Once I estimate the ordered probit speciﬁcation above, I calculate population entry thresholds
by plotting the formula
SN =
b γ1coast + b γ2province_pop
∗coast




where N =5 , and per station entry thresholds ratios such that sn = Sn
n and ratio equals sn
sn−1.
In the next section, I show results of this estimation for each year in my data. Since the cross-
section of market structure in 1996 was determined in a frame in alegality, the regulation in 1999
was intending to control competition and regulation in 2002 was aiming to liberalize the industry,
I compare results across years to determine the relation between regulation and competition.
4.2 Results
In this section I explore the empirical speciﬁcations detailed previously. Table 7 provides results of
six diﬀerent speciﬁcations. All speciﬁc a t i o n sh a v ean u m b e ro fr e s u l t si nc o m m o ns u c ha sp o s i t i v e
correlation coeﬃcients of the interactions between city population and unemployment rate, cars per
capita and bank oﬃce per thousand people. They all have a negative coeﬃcient on city population
as well as on the coastal province dummy and its interaction with province population. Finally
all of them show negative correlation coeﬃcients on the duopoly, triopoly and quadropoly dummy
variables. Speciﬁcations (1) to (3) show a positive correlation coeﬃcient on the quintopoly dummy
variable, while speciﬁcations (4) to (6) show a negative and larger in magnitude coeﬃcient on this
same quintopoly dummy.
In the end, I focus on speciﬁcation (6) for a number of reasons. First, most coeﬃcients
14and signs do not diﬀer much from other speciﬁcations in Table 7. This speciﬁcation also shows
an increasing impact of competition on variable proﬁts as I will show in the resulting structural
parameters. The second and main reason is that this last speciﬁcation diﬀers from the other ﬁve in
that this is the only one that will provide a positive estimate for the ﬁxed costs of production. All
other speciﬁcations provide negative estimates of ﬁxed costs due to the positive coeﬃcient in the
three-way interaction variable. Once I focus my attention on speciﬁcation 6, I show the resulting
structural parameters in Table 8.
Table 8 shows the structural parameters that correspond to the proﬁtm o d e la b o v ei nt h e
methodology section. This table contains three columns. The ﬁrst column speciﬁes the estimated
structural parameter. The second column shows in parentheses from what correlation coeﬃcients
estimated in Table 7 each structural parameter comes from. Note here that by assumption in
speciﬁcation (6), the parameter on city population is assumed to be 1, and the parameters λ1 and
λ3 are restricted to be 0. See also that identiﬁcation in this case relies on the assumption that
ﬁxed costs of entry do not vary with the number of entrants. The original BR papers allow for
this cost to vary, but as they announce in their BR (1991) paper including this possibility in the
speciﬁcation may prevent the estimation from identifying the impact of competition on average
variable proﬁts. This was the case for all speciﬁcations that I tried, and in the end, I chose to
assume that ﬁxed costs did not vary with entry. Once I have found the values of the structural
parameters I can proceed to estimate values for average variable proﬁts and ﬁxed costs for every
year in my sample (1996, 1999 and 2002) and for cities with one, two, three, four and ﬁve or more
stations. I provide results of this in Table 9.
Results in Table 9 are disappointing, but yet not surprising. They are disappointing in that
all estimates of average variable proﬁts are negative. This is at odds with ﬁndings in BR (1991)
and other papers using this methodology. It is comforting to know that average variable proﬁts
15go down with competition and are its lowest in those cities with ﬁve or more stations. The ﬁxed
c o s td o e sn o tv a r ym u c ha c r o s sy e a r sa n dc i t i e sw i t hd i ﬀerent number of stations. The result that
estimated average variable proﬁts are negative should not come as a surprise because of the large
presence of local government owned stations and stations managed by local civil associations that
are not proﬁt maximizers. Given this result, calculating the breaking-even S by dividing F
V is no
longer feasible since this quotient yields negative amounts (see third column in Table 9) and this
has no possible interpretation within the context of BR. For this reason, I calculate S by applying
the formula S = City_Pop+λ2Province_Pop,s i n c eIh a v ea ne s t i m a t eo fλ2 from Table 8. The
results of this are in the fourth column and the ﬁfth column contains the result of dividing S by
the number of stations. This number is supposed to provide entry threshold values for any given
number of stations in a market. Finally in the last column, I provide the ratio between S5 and Sn
for any given number n of stations. This ratio provides information on how fast entry thresholds
shrink from cities with ﬁve or more stations to cities with four, three, two or one station. In the
original BR paper, this ratio would identify how fast variable proﬁts decreased with entry (holding
constant ﬁxed costs of new entrants). In this case, since my estimation shows that average variable
proﬁts are negative, and we calculate this ratio out of observed city and province population, this
ratio just represents how fast or slow population entry thresholds increase with entry.
Let us now compare ratios across year, and in particular S5/S1. This ratio takes value 5.64 in
1996, 5.99 in 1999 and 5.06 in 2002. This means that entry thresholds grew most from monopoly
to quintopoly in 1999 and grew the least in 2002. See that this ratio is decreasing uniformly for
1999 and 2002, but it is not for 1996. This would indicate that there was not much competition
between the ﬁrst and the third entrant in 1996 and it is the fourth and the ﬁfth entrant that seem
to increase entry thresholds substantially. Patterns for 1999 and 2002 are similar in that even
though the ratio decreases to 1 monotonically, it does so more with the fourth and ﬁfth entrant.
16To examine how this entry thresholds change step by step I compute the corresponding ratios for
every year in Table 10. See in that table that year-per-year ratios for 1999 and 2002 are very
similar, and these diﬀer much from those for 1996.
Finally, I display graphically the results in the last two columns of Table 9 in Figure 1 and Figure
2. Figure 1 shows how the ratio S5/Sn converges to 1 as n goes from 1 to 5.A s m y p r e v i o u s
description stated, the evolution of the ratio for 1999 and 2002 are quite similar, if anything 1999
ratio falls from higher levels. The evolution of the 1996 ratios diﬀers much from that in 1999 and
2002 in that the ratio does not fall until the fourth entrant. This seems to indicate that under no
regulation (that is, no regulatory framework) stations in this market were less likely to compete
with each other than they were with regulation.
Finally, Figure 2 graphs population entry threshold levels by years. BR (1991) are very explicit
in that diﬀerences in levels are not good to explain diﬀerences in competition across industries.
Here, I am comparing the same industry across years. Even though I take their warning, I still
think it is useful to compare how entry thresholds vary across years. See that entry thresholds are
highest for 1999 for any number of stations in a market. In levels, 1996 and 2002 do not seem too
diﬀerent, the main diﬀerence being that the thresholds for 2002 follow the same pattern as those in
1999 and the thresholds in 1996 only rise with the fourth station in a market. In the next section
I discuss further the signiﬁcance of the results in this section.
4.3 Discussion of Results and Relation to Literature
The research in this paper estimates the nature of competition in the Spanish local television
industry between 1996 and 2002. These years are interesting to study because this industry
transitioned from a status of alegality (no regulation or law was in place regulating agents in this
industry) to being strongly regulated in 1999 and liberalized by 2002. The results above indicate
17that under no regulation stations faced softer competition than when regulated. Within the two
years under study when the industry was already regulated, stations faced stronger competition
when the industry was highly regulated than when the industry was liberalized. This result is
at odds with results from the literature. For example, Danzon and Chao (2000) observe stronger
competition in generic products in pharmaceutical industries in more deregulated countries. Here
I ﬁnd the opposite in that when no regulation is in place stations seem to collude the most (up to
the fourth entrant). In addition to this, when comparing results from 1999 and 2002, if anything,
stations in 2002 after the industry liberalization took place seem to compete less strongly than they
did in 1999.
The reason of this result is explained by the type of regulation introduced in 1999. This
regulation forced a lot of local government oversight and even ownership and management. On
top of this, it prevented stations to form networks with other stations and therefore any possibility
of collusion. After the industry liberalization and the new law of 2002, private ownership and
management of stations was allowed and stations networks were permitted. Given the little
proﬁtability in this industry (my estimates show that the average station was losing money), stations
may have found proﬁtable to coordinate and collude with each other by sharing content through
the formation of local station networks. The question arises when interpreting the result for 1996.
It is quite conceivable that with no proﬁtability and no government or regulation oversight stations
may have had all incentives in the world (and no punishment since they were alegal) to collude and
soften competition even further than estimated for the year 2002, and even more so than observed
in 1999.
To summarize, this seems to be an example of an industry that when tightly regulated ﬁrms
(in this case stations) competed among them more strongly than in the absence of all regulation
or with a liberalized and permissive regulatory framework.
185C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, I empirically examine whether regulation increases or decreases competition between
ﬁrms. For this reason, I use data from the Spanish local television industry on station location
and market demographics for the years 1996, 1999 and 2002. During these years, the industry
went from no regulation whatsoever (prior to 1996) to being highly regulated (1996 to 1999) and
to being liberalized (2000 to 2004). I estimate for every year how population entry thresholds vary
with the number of entrants to infer the number of consumers necessary for a station to break even
and therefore determine how relatively competitive this industry became across diﬀerent years in
the study.
I ﬁnd that stations faced softer competition prior to 1996 when the industry was not regulated
at all. When the industry was regulated, I ﬁnd that, if anything, stations faced softer competition
when the industry was liberalized than when this was highly regulated. This result is at ﬁrst
sight at odds with common economic intuition and results in the previous empirical literature. I
rationalize this result by understanding that proﬁtability in this industry is very low (as a matter
of fact I estimate negative average variable proﬁts across years and market of diﬀerent structure)
and that when liberalized, stations were allowed to form local station networks that allowed them
to share content, coordinate activities and communicate. When liberalizing this industry, stations
faced strong incentives to collude and soften competition among them to maximize their chances
of survival.
Most previous papers exploring the same topic havee x a m i n e dh o wc h a n g e si ne x i s t i n gr e g u l a t i o n
impacts the nature of competition. This paper diﬀers from those in that I examine how competition
changes when an industry transitions from a status of alegality and no regulation to one of legality
and regulation, as well as how competition in this industry moves from being highly regulated
19to highly liberalized. It is my understanding from examining the literature that despite the
clear importance of this research question, this has not received much attention until now. The
interpretation of my results also shows that it is important when evaluating the impact of regulation
to understand industry institutions as well as the regulation in place and the changes applied to it.
I hope that this paper will foster others to explore other industries and study further the impact
of regulation on competition as well as consumer surplus and society welfare.
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22Table 1. Summary statistics across year 1996, 1999 and 2002
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
No. Stations per City 9627 0.257 0.770 0 17
Monopoly? 9627 0.134 0.340 0 1
Duopoly? 9627 0.027 0.162 0 1
Triopoly? 9627 0.009 0.093 0 1
Quadropoly? 9627 0.003 0.054 0 1
Quintopoly? 9627 0.004 0.065 0 1
City Population (000) 9627 12.174 67.726 0.322 3016.788
City Growth 9627 0.038 0.113 -0.777 5.726
Province Population (000) 9627 1223.664 1363.042 56.929 5527.152
Province Growth 9627 0.029 0.034 -0.053 0.215
Unemployment Rate per City 9627 3.887 1.901 0 25
Cars per capita and City 9627 0.367 0.146 0.042 7.079
Bank Office per capita and City 9627 0.410 0.427 0 4.009
Province on the Coast? 9627 0.557 0.497 0 1
Note: This table provides summary statistics of all variables used in the empirical analysis. The number of observations for all
variables is 9627, that is, 3207 observations for each year in the sample 1996, 1999 and 2002.Table 2. Summary statistics by year
1996 1999 2002
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean (Std. Dev.)
No. Stations per City 0.269 0.228 0.275
(0.835) (0.646) (0.813)
Monopoly? 0.127 0.134 0.140
(0.333) (0.341) (0.347)
Duopoly? 0.030 0.025 0.026
(0.171) (0.155) (0.159)
Triopoly? 0.011 0.006 0.009
(0.102) (0.079) (0.096)
Quadropoly? 0.003 0.003 0.003
(0.053) (0.053) (0.056)
Quintopoly? 0.005 0.002 0.006
(0.068) (0.043) (0.079)
City Population (000) 11.927 12.037 12.558
(66.869) (66.903) (69.394)
City Growth 0.011 0.044 0.060
(0.039) (0.147) (0.119)
Province Population (000) 1199.522 1210.029 1261.442
(1328.110) (1340.618) (1418.267)
Province Growth 0.008 0.032 0.048
(0.007) (0.036) (0.038)
Unemployment Rate per City 5.117 3.347 3.196
(2.021) (1.478) (1.512)
Cars per capita and City 0.332 0.362 0.408
(0.100) (0.119) (0.193)
Bank Office per capita and City 0.446 0.433 0.352
(0.459) (0.443) (0.366)
Province on the Coast? 0.557 0.557 0.557
(0.497) (0.497) (0.497)
Note: This table provides summary statistics of all variables by year. Each year contains information for 3209 cities.Table 3. Cross-Tabulation of No Stations per City for years 1996 and 1999
No Stations per City 1999
No Stations per 
City 1996 0123456 1 2 1 3Total
0 2,504 133 9100000 2,647
1 1 5 3 2 1 8 3 1 410000 4 0 7
2 6 6 1 2 4 231000 9 7










Total 2,665 430 79 20 92211 3,209
Note: This table shows results of cross-tabulating the number of stations per city in 1996 with the number of stations per city in 1999.Table 4. Cross-Tabulation of No Stations per City for years 1999 and 2002
No Stations per City 2002
No Stations per 
City 1999 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 13 16 Total
0 2,565 96 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,665
1 48 331 36 11 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 430
2 3 2 2 3 5 1 242000100 0 7 9
3 1 0 7623000010 0 2 0
4 0 0 1122210000 0 9
5 0 0 0001001000 0 2
6 0 0 0000200000 0 2
12 0 0 0000000001 0 1
13 0 0 0000000000 1 1
Total 2,617 449 83 30 10 10 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 3,209
Note: This table shows results of cross-tabulating the number of stations per city in 1999 with the number of stations per city in 2002.Table 5. Cross-Tabulation of No Stations per City for years 1996 and 2002
No Stations per City 2002
No Stations per 
City 1996 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 13 16 Total
0 2,459 172 14 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,647
1 147 214 33 8 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 407
2 65 6 1 7 1 0 5 30000000 9 7
3 5 61 470 20000000 3 4
4 0 1 321 00010100 9
5 0 0 210 00000000 3
6 0 0 010 02100000 4
7 0 0 000 01001000 2
8 0 0 000 10000000 1
9 0 0 000 10000010 2
13 0 0 000 01000000 1
15 0 0 000 00000001 1
17 0 0 001 00000000 1
Total 2,617 449 83 30 10 10 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 3,209
Note: This table shows results of cross-tabulating the number of stations per city in 1999 with the number of stations per city in 2002.Table 6. Cross-Tabulation of Changes in No Stations per City between 1996-1999 and 1999-2002
Change in No Stations 1999-2002
Change in No Stations 







-2 002 1 0 75210 2 7
-1 013 1 7 5 3 5 9101 2 2 5
0 0 1 36 2,625 85 6210 2,756
1 00 3 3 1 1 7 1 4 1200 1 6 7
2 124711000 1 6
3 0002200004
Total 1 4 78 2,942 149 24 7 2 2 3,209
Note: This table shows results of cross-tabulating the changes in number of stations per city between 1996-1999 and 1999-2002.Table 7. Results from Ordered Probit Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
City Pop (000s) -0.0719 -0.0719 -0.0713 -0.0500 -0.0681 -0.0408
(0.0094)*** (0.0094)*** (0.0087)*** (0.0069)*** (0.0087)*** (0.0086)***
Unemp*City Pop 0.0043 0.0043 0.0044 0.0009 0.0049 0.0026
(0.0006)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0006)*** (0.0005)* (0.0007)*** (0.0007)***
Cars pc*City Pop 0.0378 0.0378 0.0324 0.0332 0.0312 0.0151
(0.0171)** (0.0171)** (0.0153)** (0.0122)*** (0.0142)** (0.0139)
Banks pc*City Pop 0.0256 0.0256 0.0270 0.0283 0.0167 0.0071
(0.0118)** (0.0118)** (0.0106)** (0.0057)*** (0.0079)** (0.0073)
Duopoly*City Pop -0.0082 -0.0082 -0.0053 -0.0032 -0.0058 -0.0008
(0.0047)* (0.0047)* (0.0040) (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.0031)
Triopoly*City Pop -0.1121 -0.1121 -0.0666 -0.0100 -0.1724 -0.1074
(0.0479)** (0.0479)** (0.0122)*** (0.0066) (0.0209)*** (0.0172)***
Quadropoly*City Pop -0.3012 -0.3012 -0.2618 -0.0546 -0.7395 -0.4948
(0.0527)*** (0.0527)*** (0.0624)*** (0.0365) (0.0943)*** (0.0724)***
Quintopoly*City Pop 3.8225 3.8225 1.0719 -1.0920 -8.9949 -6.1318
(0.5706)*** (0.5706)*** (0.2194)*** (0.6799) (1.1082)*** (0.8489)***
City Pop Growth -0.4525 -0.4525 -0.5509 0.9821
(0.7683) (0.7683) (0.6939) (0.6373)
Province Pop 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002
(0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** (0.00004)***
Province Pop Growth 1.6617 1.6617
(2.2432) (2.2432)
Province Coast -0.1546 -0.1546 -0.1948 -0.4433 -0.1990 -0.3216
(0.0518)*** (0.0518)*** (0.0529)*** (0.0441)*** (0.0501)*** (0.0443)***
Coast*City Pop -0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0037 0.0039 -0.0051
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0023)* (0.0033)
Coast*Province Pop -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001
(0.00004)*** (0.00004)*** (0.00005)*** (0.00002)*** (0.00004)*** (0.00003)**
Coast*City Pop* 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.000003 0.00001
Province Pop (0.000001)*** (0.000001)*** (0.000001)*** (0.000001)*** (0.000001)***
Observations 9627 9627 9627 9627 9627 9627
This table shows results from running ordered probit specifications following the profit function specified in the
text. I do not report here coefficients for interactions between unemployment rate, cars, and banks with province
population, and town and province population growth.
Table 8 maps coefficients in specification (6) into the structural paramenters in the model. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 8. Structural Parameters from Specification (6) Table 7
α1 (=City Pop) -0.0408
β1 (=Unemployment*City Pop) 0.0026
β2 (=Cars pc*City Pop) 0.0151
β3 (=Banks pc*City Pop) 0.0071
α2 (=Duopoly*City Pop) -0.0008
α3 (=Triopoly*City Pop) -0.1074
α4 (=Quadropoly*City Pop) -0.4948
α5 (=Quintopoly*City Pop) -6.1318
λ1 0 0
λ2 (=Province Pop/City Pop) -0.0045
λ3 0 0
γ1 (= Province Coast?) -0.3216
γ2 (=Coast*Province Pop) -0.00007
Note: This table maps coefficients from specification (6) in Table 7 
into the structural parameters in the model.
See that specification restricts λ1 and λ3 to equal zero.Table 9. Calculation of Variable Profits, Fixed Costs and Entry Thresholds
Year No Stations V F
Implied S 
(=F/V) S (model) S/n S5/Sn
1996 1 -0.0185 0.3107 -16.7831 19.4847 19.4847 5.640734
2 -0.0180 0.3204 -17.8007 57.5243 28.7621 3.821273
3 -0.1222 0.3573 -2.9231 69.0155 23.0052 4.77753
4 -0.5093 0.3559 -0.6987 182.4240 45.6060 2.409943
5 or more -6.1465 0.3611 -0.0588 549.5394 109.9079 1
1999 1 -0.0231 0.3044 -13.1771 22.5581 22.5581 5.994694
2 -0.0221 0.3443 -15.6055 72.0836 36.0418 3.751997
3 -0.1284 0.2825 -2.1995 128.5751 42.8584 3.155244
4 -0.5144 0.3333 -0.6480 390.5478 97.6370 1.385015
5 or more -6.1508 0.2678 -0.0435 676.1428 135.2286 1
2002 1 -0.0240 0.3246 -13.5240 17.7086 17.7086 5.069642
2 -0.0232 0.2988 -12.8606 54.1928 27.0964 3.313221
3 -0.1289 0.2774 -2.1518 95.8040 31.9347 2.811254
4 -0.5158 0.2992 -0.5801 278.3688 69.5922 1.290035
5 or more -6.1515 0.2630 -0.0427 448.8821 89.7764 1
Note: This table calculates the implied from the model variable profits V, Fixed Costs F and S=F/V.
Since this quocient always appears to be negative, I calculate S as = City Pop + λ2*Province Pop.
S/n divides S by number of stations, and S5/Sn calculates the rate of change in S between monopoly and 5 or more stations.Table 10. Entry Threshold Ratios
Year S2/S1 S3/S2 S4/S3 S5/S4
1996 1.47614 0.79984 1.98242 2.40994
1999 1.59773 1.18913 2.27813 1.38501
2002 1.53013 1.17856 2.17921 1.29004
Note: This table shows how entry thresholds vary per entrant within a year. To
calculate this ratios, I use entry thresholds from Table 9. 
 
 






















Figure 2. Entry Threshold per Station by Number of Stations
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